The increasing number of antitrust cases that a¤ect more than one country calls for more active cooperation between competition authorities. I analyse the impact of exchange of con…dential information between two authorities deciding on a multinational merger. The authorities want to clear the merger if the information sent by the …rm suggests that the expected welfare in their country will be enhanced and the …rm can secretly manipulate the precision with which it transmits this information. The authorities di¤er in their leniency towards the merger and we focus on the cases where the authorities disagree about the decision. Under no information-sharing, the …rm chooses an extreme level of precision: very high (low) for the most (least) lenient authority. Under information-sharing, the …rm is restricted to choose the same precision for both authorities. The …rm's choice depends on the level of cooperation in the decision-making between the countries. If the authorities exert their veto power, the …rm always uses the lowest level of precision. If the authorities also cooperate in the decision-making, the …rm's choice of precision may be non-monotonic in the average welfare implications and intermediate levels of precision are chosen. Other situations where the model can be applied abound in industrial organisation and political economy.
Introduction
"Most o¢ cials believe that the issue of con…dentiality is the chief limitation of enforcement cooperation agreements and hence it is submitted that the majority of e¤ort should be concentrated on overcoming this particular obstruction to e¤ective cooperation between antitrust agencies." Marsden and Whelan (2005) , p.24.
With globalization, competition has had an increasingly international dimension.
A clear example is the existence of international cartels, such as the vitamins cartel which took place between January 1990 and February 1999, as well as the increasing number of mergers that involve more than one jurisdiction. 1 Both examples suggest the need to enhance cooperation between competition agencies. 2 There has been a proliferation of multilateral platforms where various policy issues are discussed such as the ICN (International Competition Network) and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Similarly, many bilateral agreements have emerged. As pointed out by the quotation above, it is believed that one of the main limitations of these agreements is the impossibility of exchanging con…dential information between competition authorities. The most prominent example of this type of agreement is the one between the E.U. and the U.S. 3 A minority of competition policy agreements expressly provide for the exchange of con…dential information. For instance, the bilateral agreement between the U.S.
and Australia 4 , the trilateral agreement between Iceland, Norway and Denmark 5 and, more recently, the agreement between competition authorities of the European Member States 6 .
1 UNCTAD (2000) shows that the share of cross-border mergers increased to 78% of the world FDI in the late 1990's. 2 For instance, the U.S. agencies have about 120 mergers' noti…cations to foreign governments in a two-year period. In some 64 of them there is additional contact with the foreign agency where publicly-available information is exchanged. In about 40 cases the agencies engage in some level of cooperation, but con…dential business information is only exchanged if a waiver is granted, which happens in some 16 cases. See OECD (2003) . 3 The issue of exchange of con…dential information has been raised in many occasions. In 2002, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) requested court documents, gathered during a U.S. antitrust case against Intel several years before, to be transferred to the European Commission as support for a complaint against Intel. AMD believed that many of the issues in the U.S. case were similar to the questions under investigation by the E.C. 7 The goal of this paper is to explore the …rm's incentives to provide precise information when two authorities decide to share this information. We describe the model in a merger control context, although it is applicable to many other settings.
It naturally can be used to study information sharing between other authorities such as a sectorial regulator or central bank and a competition authority (as it is the case with mergers involving banks). But more generally, it sheds light on the vagueness of the information publicly conveyed to two di¤erent audiences. For instance, in a joint interview by di¤erent units of a …rm, a project approval by di¤erent departments or a reform submitted to bicameral parliaments.
In the model, a competition authority ("she") is assessing the welfare implications of a merger from the information provided by a multinational …rm ("he"). Neither the …rm nor the authority have private information concerning the merger welfare e¤ects 8 . The …rm conveys the information through a noisy signal 9 , from which the authority observes a random realization. The …rm can choose to secretly manipulate the precision with which he transmits this information to the authority at no cost. We model this by allowing the …rm to choose the variance 10 of the signal, for instance, by adding or substracting relevant documents. The choice of the noise is unobservable because the authority does not actually know how precise is the information that the …rm has. A larger quantity of information does not necessarily imply more precision as some of it may be irrelevant and authorities have a limited amount of time to process it. Adding bias to the signal involes lying or withholding incriminating documents. This is very costly for a …rm that is in the middle of an investigation as with high chances he may be discovered and punished accordingly 11 ; as a result the signal is unbiased.
The policy decision is binary (to clear the merger or not) and depends on the realization of the signal. The authority adopts a cut-o¤ rule whereby, if the realization of the signal is above some threshold, she clears the merger and she blocks it otherwise.
When the …rm deals with a single authority or, equivalently, when the two authorities do not share information 12 , the optimal variance chosen by the …rm does not depend on how good or bad the average merger is (i.e. how far the average merger is above or below the policy threshold) but rather on whether it is good or bad (i.e. above or below the threshold). In particular, if the average merger is bad, the …rm chooses the risky strategy of the largest variance to have more chances to be thought good. By contrast, if the average merger is good, the …rm uses the lowest variance to decrease the likelihood of obtaining an extreme realization of the signal.
This strategy does not change depending on whether the authority can commit to the policy ex-ante. We improve upon the existing literature by establishing the optimal response (i.e. policy threshold) of the authority to the …rm's behavior. If the authority cannot commit to a policy ex-ante, the ex-post optimal threshold when the average merger is welfare detrimental (enhancing) is stricter (more lenient) than the full information threshold. Interestingly, when there is uncertainty about the merger's undesirability, the authority's ability to commit (for instance, by issuing detailed guidelines) makes her set a more lenient threshold to induce the …rm to provide more precise information. Otherwise, the authority sets the ex-post optimal threshold.
To study the consequences of information-sharing, we consider the case where one authority is more lenient than the other (i.e. their policy thresholds di¤er), either because their tolerance to mergers di¤er or because the same underlying state variable has di¤erent welfare implications in the two countries. Furthermore, for the merger to go through, the approval by both countries is needed. When the authorities commit to share information by signing an agreement, the …rm can no longer choose the precision of the signal tailor-made to convice a particular authority.
Instead, the …rm makes a unique choice of variance for both authorities. Moreover, we restrict the meaning of information-sharing to the authorities observing the same realization of the signal submitted by the …rm 13 .
We explore the impact of the information-sharing regime on the incentives of the …rm to provide precise information 14 . The agreement only has an impact on the …rm's behavior when the average merger is "con ‡icting", that is, it is good for one country but bad for the other. This impact will depend on the particular rule that the authorities use to deal with the case of disagreement (i.e. when the realization of the signal lies between their thresholds). We consider di¤erent possible rules to deal with disagreement.
If the authorities have veto power (i.e. each country can unilaterally block the merger), then sharing information induces the …rm to send a very imprecise signal, making the more lenient country strictly worse o¤.
Another possibility is to extend the cooperation beyond the information-sharing stage, by having some informal bargaining/persuasion process (not explicitly modelled in this paper) in the decision-taking. We model the outcome of the bargaining process as the merger being approved with some probability in case of disagreement.
First, we take this probability as being …xed and exogenous, which may be interpreted as the authorities'relative bargaining power. The choice of the variance in this case may be non-monotonic in the expected merger, and, intermediate values of variance are chosen in equilibrium. When the average merger is relatively bad for the less lenient country, the …rm still chooses an extreme variance. In particular, the …rm chooses high variance to increase the chances of being above the more lenient threshold (where the merger is cleared for sure). Under some conditions 15 , as the average merger improves, he switches to low variance to increase the chances of being cleared at least with some probability. When the average merger is relatively less welfare detrimental for the stricter country, it becomes safer to play a riskier strategy of choosing an intermediate variance. Furthermore, this variance decreases as the average merger approaches to the policy threshold of the stricter country. This is because the chances of having the merger cleared are already high and, by reducing 13 We discuss in the Conclusions possible implications of letting each authority observe an independent realization of the same signal. 14 We do not let the policy thresholds change following the agreement. The policy thresholds are the same for both national and international mergers (which are a minority), so the authorities may decide not to be strategic in their choices. 15 The countries have equal bargaining power and the authorities' policies are far apart or the lowest variance is low enough. the variance, the probability of having it blocked by both authorities is decreased.
We also consider the case where the probability of approval depends on the particular realization of the signal. This captures the idea that the less lenient country is more willing to clear the merger if the realization falls near her threshold as compared to when it falls very far from it. In particular, we consider the case where this probability is an odd increasing function of the signal realization. From the point of view of the …rm, it is as if there were a unique but uncertain threshold.
Because of the rotational symmetry of the function, the …rm considers the expected threshold and behaves as in the case of one authority with respect to this threshold.
To sum up, if authorities exert their veto power, then sharing information is a bad idea because the …rm will submit very imprecise information. Further cooperation modi…es the …rm's payo¤ structure in such a way that the …rm makes a greater use of intermediate and lower levels of noise (as compared to the veto power case) and, therefore, it can be potentially good if the lenient country is not always the same one.
Related literature
This is a signal-jamming model, like the ones used in the career concerns literature 16 , where the …rm jams the signal, not by manipulating its mean but by changing its variance, and hence its information content.
The choice of variability as a strategic variable has been considered in a large variety of setups. For instance, Anderson and Cabral (2007) analyze a model of R&D races where the two contestants, taking as given the level of R&D expenditure, need to choose a level of risk. Tsetlin et al. (2004) consider the choice of variability of the performance distribution in a multi-round contest. In the compensation literature, Gaba and Kalra (1999) introduce the level of dispersion of the probability distribution of sales as a choice variable besides the level of e¤ort. The general conclusion of all these papers is that the players that are at disadvantage tend to optimally choose more risky strategies than those who are in a favorable position. We also …nd this "gambling for resurrection" behavior in our national merger framework. However, this behavior may disappear in the multinational merger case if authorities decide to cooperate both in the decision making as well as at the information-sharing stage.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) also consider the incentives of a …rm to provide its 16 See Holmstrom (1982 Holmstrom ( , 1999 and Dewatripont et al. (1999) .
potential customers with more or less precise information. They show how the seller's supply of information a¤ects the shape of the distribution of buyers'expected valuations and hence generates rotations of the demand curve. These rotations generate a convexity in the monopolist's pro…ts, which explains the optimality of the monopolist's extreme choices of variance in Lewis and Sappington (1994) . Contrary to Johnson and Myatt (2006) , in our model there is another strategic player: the competition authority. In particular, our …rm will choose a level of precision in order to maximize the chances that the realization of the signal falls above the policy threshold level chosen by the authority. On the other hand, the authority will choose the threshold in order to maximize the (ex-post or ex-ante) expected welfare.
In the Johnson and Myatt paper, the monopolist is choosing both the precision and the threshold (i.e. the price) in order to maximize the ex-post expected pro…ts.
As far as we are aware, another distinctive feature of our model with respect to the previous work is that the noise (and hence, the distribution of the signal) is not observed by the receiver. In our framework, observability of the noise renders the problem trivial because the competition authority could simply condition the policy threshold on the noise and block any merger with an imprecise report. 
The model
We consider a multinational …rm (M) proposing a merger that must be cleared under the competition law of the country. and this distribution is common knowledge.
The actions available to the players are the following. M sends a message containing the information about to R but he does so through a noisy signal 19 . In particular, the signal has the following form:
where " is a random variable distributed according to a Normal distribution with mean zero and variance V . M can secretly choose V , which re ‡ects the precision with which the message is sent (the larger the V , the less informative is the realization of the signal about ). For instance, M can add or subtract relevant documents and this choice is secret because R does not know which documents M has. For simplicity, we assume that M can only choose 20 The …rm cannot, however, exaggerate the welfare bene…ts of the merger by shifting upwards the mean of " (i.e. lying is not possible and therefore, the signal should be on average equal to ). This is because the chances of being 17 Otherwise, he would not have proposed it in the …rst place. 18 This assumption is standard in the career concerns literature. We discuss in Section 5 the consequences of relaxing it. 19 The signal can be noisy, either because the production technology (i.e. the way in which the …rm compiles and transmits the information about the merger) is noisy or the perception of the receiver is imperfect (for instance, Kolstad et al. (1990) analyse the optimal use of ex-ante safety regulation and ex-post tort liability. In their model, there is uncertainty about how a court will interpret whether or not the injurer met the standard of due care). 20 There are many justi…cations for V L > 0. For instance, nobody knows exactly until the merger takes place, M is not able to compile and transmit the information perfectly (e.g., it is costly) or there is uncertainty about R's interpretation of the evidence. discovered and punished accordingly are high for a …rm that is in the middle of an investigation 21 . Therefore, the distribution of the signal S, g (s; V ), is Normal with mean and variance 2 + V and G (s; V ) is the cumulative distribution.
R observes the realization of the signal s, updates her beliefs about , and chooses the appropriate probability of clearance p(s). We consider the case where p(s) is a cut-o¤ rule 22 , where b s is optimally determined by R:
The timing of the game depends on whether R has the ability to commit to a particular threshold before the information is transmitted by M. Under no commitment, the timing is as follows. Finally, the payo¤s are realized. We solve this model backwards. 21 Another reason for abstracting from the possiblity of biasing the signal upwards is because, without penalization, the incentives for increasing the bias are clear, completely monotonic, and independent from the noise dimension. Moreover, the …rm would like to bias the report in the same direction for both authorities and we want to focus on the actions that di¤er depending on the authority that is in charge. For a model that considers both the manipulation of the mean and the precision of the signal see Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2012). The authors analyse how the incentives of a seller to provide biased and/or imprecise advice to consumers are a¤ected by the possibility of facing ex-post litigation, where a court will infer how much lying has taken place and penalise accordingly. 22 The monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds in the setup. This is a su¢ cient condition for a cut-o¤ rule to be optimal if the authority cannot commit to a threshold ex-ante (see Milgrom (1981) ). It is not clear whether there is any loss of generality in the case where the authority can commit to a policy. Obviously, if the behaviour of the …rm does not change under the more general rule e p(s), then a cut-o¤ rule dominates e p(s), as it is ex-post optimal. Section 4.2.2 shows that if e p(s) is non-decreasing, continous and odd function, the behaviour of the …rm does not change. Example 1 in the Appendix provides another example where e p(s) = Z(s) and Z(s) is a cummulative Normal distribution.
For comparison purposes, we restrict ourselves to a cut-o¤ rule also in the commitment case. 23 R does not infer the noise used based on the unique realisation of the signal. This assumption is not restrictive because, in the no-commitment case, R has point beliefs about V which will not be a¤ected by letting R make inferences from s. In the commitment case, it would be di¢ cult for the authority to justify blocking the merger of an extreme positive realisation, given that all realisations can happen with positive probability and MLRP holds. The …rm objective is to choose a level of precision that maximizes the probability of having the merger cleared. M makes a conjecture about the policy threshold used by R, b s c , where the superscript stands for conjecture. Using Bayes rule, M maximizes the probability of having the merger cleared:
The objective function is decreasing in V whenever the average merger is a good merger (i.e. b s c < ) and increasing in V when the average merger is a bad merger
Lemma 1 Under no-commitment, the optimal variance is:
Proof. See Appendix.
For simplicity, we will assume that if b s c is exactly the …rm will choose V L .
The intuition supporting this optimal strategy is that, by increasing the variance, an expected bad merger obtains more chances to be thought good. By contrast, decreasing the variance cuts down an expected good merger's chance of being considered bad. Therefore, the optimal V does not depend on how far the particular is from b s c , only on whether lies below or above b s c . This is due to the "bang-bang" payo¤ structure created by the cut-o¤ rule. This "gambling for resurrection" result is in line with the …ndings of the literature that considers the choice of variability as a strategic variable 24 .
24 See Section 1.1.
The problem of the competition authority
Given the realization s and the conjecture that R forms about M's choice V c , she needs to decide whether to clear the merger or not. The ex-post expected welfare of the merger is: is zero:
Denote the solution of equation (1) 
Proof. It is straightforward to solve equation (1) . Figure 1 depicts the optimal threshold b s as a function of the average merger . 25 If the bulk of mergers are bad mergers ( < 0), then the authority increases the standard of proof of a good merger by setting the policy threshold above the neutral merger 0. Conversely, when the average merger is welfare enhancing ( > 0), the authority sets a very lenient standard of proof, tolerating even negative signals.
Finally, note that as V L tends to 0, the report becomes extremely informative and b s increases to zero (i.e. R becomes stricter with the on average good mergers as the probability of "unlucky realizations", that is, s < , decreases). Similarly, as V H tends to +1, the report submitted by M becomes uninformative and b s tends to +1, so all the mergers that may raise competition issue on average will be blocked. 
Again, let us break indi¤erence by assuming that M will choose V L .
When the competition authority can commit to the policy, she chooses b s to maximize the ex-ante expected welfare, taking into account the behavior of the …rm:
where the term in brackets is the expected welfare given a realization s, W (s; b s).
26
Proposition 2 There exist e such that, under commitment, the optimal threshold b s is:
s is non-monotonic in the expected welfare and e strictly increases (decreases)
As in Figure 1 , we depict b s as a function of in Figure 2 .
Note that the authority values the level of precision of the signal as this allows her to make fewer mistakes when deciding whether to clear the merger or not.
When the average merger is welfare enhancing ( > 0), by Lemma 1, M chooses V L . Since, this is as informative as the report can be, R sets the ex-post optimal threshold found in Section 3.1.2.
By the same Lemma, when the average merger is welfare detrimental, M chooses V H . This introduces a new trade-o¤ for the competition authority because she may decide to distort the ex-post optimal policy upwards in order to extract more precise information from the …rm. Indeed, we …nd that, when there is substantial uncertainty about the undesirability of the average merger ( is negative and close to zero, i.e.,
2 [e ; 0]), then R gains from committing to a more lenient threshold (not only more lenient than the ex-post optimal threshold but also than the full information threshold) in order to induce M to reduce his equilibrium variance from V H to V L .
On the other hand, if the merger is on average clearly welfare detrimental ( < e ), the authority will again set the ex-post optimal threshold found in Section 3.1.2.
26 The objective function is equivalent to Finally, note that if V L increases, the range of mergers for which the authority is more lenient than the ex-post optimal, [e ; 0], shrinks as there is less gain from obtaining a less precise signal. Similarly, this range will expand if V H increases.
Multinational merger
In this section we consider the situation where a multinational wants to undertake the same merger in two di¤erent countries (or jurisdictions) and these countries di¤er in terms of their policies. The policies are the same for national and multinational mergers. Since the multinational mergers are a minority, we abstract from strategic policy changes to take into account the international dimension. When the competition authorities do not share information about the …rm, the 27 Another possible justi…cation is that the merger is expected to have di¤erent competitive e¤ects, for instance because the market concentration levels or the likelihood of coordinated interaction are di¤erent.
28 To be precise, we need
. 29 It is easy to check that the resulting equilibrium threshold under no-commitment is: problem of the multinational is separable and we are back to the national merger case. The multinational needs to convince each authority individually, regardless of the way in which authorities reach an agreement ex-post. In other words, he chooses a level of precision for each country so as to maximize the probability of having the merger cleared in each country. By Lemma 1, the …rm will choose V L in Country 1 and V H in Country 2.
When the authorities share information, they receive the same realization of the signal, thus the problem of the multinational is no longer separable. The multinational needs to choose a unique level of precision so as to maximize the probability of having the merger cleared. This probability will depend on the process by which a …nal decision on the international merger is reached and we consider several possi-
Information-sharing with veto power
Consider …rst the case where the authorities only cooperate in exchanging information but not in their decision process, i.e. the authorities use their veto power.
The only disagreement that can arise is that Country 1 wants to clear the merger, while Country 2 does not want this. Country 2 using its veto power translates into the merger being cleared only if both competition authorities agree that the merger should be cleared (i.e. if the signal is above b s 2 ) and as a result the …rm chooses V H .
Information-sharing with cooperation in the decisionmaking
We turn now to the case where there is a bargaining or persuasion process taking place between the authorities, for example, due to the repeated interaction between them. We model this decision as taking place in two stages: …rst, the competition authorities decide unilaterally whether they should clear the merger and, then, if the decisions di¤er, they discuss their arguments until they reach an agreement. 34 From 34 For instance, in the WorldCom / Sprint merger review, the co-operation between the Europan Commission and the US Department of Justice involved such an extensive sharing of information (thanks to a con…dentiality waiver granted by the parties) that allowed both case teams to discuss in-depth the merits of the case and to reach consistent assessments of the competitive impact of the transaction on the area of joint concern. For this, and many more examples where information-the point of view of the …rm, the outcome of this bargaining is a con ‡icting merger being cleared with some probability. We consider two ways of how this probability is determined.
Constant probability
We …rst analyze the case where, if there is disagreement, the merger is cleared with probability (even though Country 2 does not want this) and blocked with probability 1
. The parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the bargaining power of the authority in Country 1 versus the one in Country 2. M maximizes the probability of having the merger cleared:
for 2 (0; 1).
Since lies in between the thresholds, the …rst part of his objective function is decreasing in V , while the second part is increasing in V . In other words, when the …rm chooses a high variance, this decreases the mass of the probability distribution 
This result relies on the fact that the curvature of the …rm's objective function depends on . In particular, the objective function is quasi-convex in V for 2 (b s 1 ; s M ) and quasi-concave in V for 2 (s M ; b s 2 ).
sharing has lead to a more active cooperation that have resulted in decisions to clear mergers, see OECD (2001).
Thus, for 2 (b s 1 ; s M ), M chooses either V H for all or it starts with V H and then switches to V L if the following condition holds:
This condition states that, by choosing V L , as opposed to V H , M loses chances of being cleared with probability 1 but may increase the chances of being cleared with probability if is close enough to s M and depending on how far away from is the crossing point between g (s; V L ) and g (s; V H ). The switch happens more often when is larger.
The following two corollaries state the precise variance that the …rm chooses, when the authorities have equal bargaining power, that is, for = 
where c(V L ; V H ) increases with V H and V L .
There exists a threshold such that a su¢ cient condition for M to …rst choose
These conditions are not necessary.
Proof. See Appendix. Note from Corollary 2 that for a given pair of policy thresholds fb s 1 ; b s 2 g, the larger V H , the larger c(V L ; V H ) and hence, the more likely it is that we are in the case where the …rm chooses V H for all 2 (b s 1 ; s M ). In the same way, the smaller V L or the larger the con ‡ict between authorities (b s 2 b s 1 ), the more likely it is that we are in the regime where the …rm chooses …rst V H and then V L . Therefore, if the authorities have equal bargaining power and their con ‡ict is large (or it is possible for all the values of V . However, the larger the variance, the higher the probability of obtaining a realization above b s 2 where the merger is cleared with probability 1 rather than 1 2 . Therefore, he will choose V H . By continuity, the same intuition holds for the average mergers that are in between b s 1 and , where is de…ned in equation (13) . If the minimum variance is low enough (or the con ‡ict between authorities is high enough), then it is optimal for the …rm to switch to V L after in order to maximize the chances of being cleared at least by Country 1. It is at this point that the new trade-o¤ becomes e¤ective.
The …rm with an average merger just in the middle, = s M , is indi¤erent between any variance. The reason for this is that the probability of having the merger cleared is 1 2 for all possible values of V due to the symmetry of the probability function at this point.
As exceeds s M , the objective function of the …rm becomes quasi-concave in V . ; however the higher the variance, the higher the probability that the realization of the signal is below b s 1 where the merger is blocked, rather than cleared with probability 1 2 . As a result, the …rm
The information-sharing agreement has modi…ed the payo¤ structure, which is no longer "bang-bang" as in Section 3. As a result, the …rm makes a greater use of intermediate levels of variability in a non-monotonic way.
Increasing probability
Now we consider the case where the bargaining power of Country 1 increases monotonically with the particular realization s. This re ‡ects the fact that the closer s is to b s 2 , the less reluctant will Country 2 be about clearing the merger as compared to a realization s very close to b s 1 . We consider the case of a continuous, increasing and odd (with respect s M ;
1 2 ) function (s). The expected probability of clearance then becomes:
Contrary to the previous case, now increasing the variance does not unambiguously decrease the probability of being cleared if the realization s falls in the interval (b s 1 ; b s 2 ) because these realizations have attached di¤erent probabilities of clearance. 35 Note that: dV ; 
See Because of the symmetry of (s) around s M ; 1 2 , the …rm takes the expectation and behaves as in the national merger case with respect to this unique threshold. That is, the …rm uses high variance whenever he thinks the merger is not going to pass through ( < s M ) and low variance otherwise.
Information-sharing with cooperation in the policy-making
So far, we have assumed that each authority is …xing its policy threshold unilaterally.
In this section, we consider the situation where the authorities …x a unique threshold, b s J , for both countries, for instance, in the European case, this would correspond to the European Commission setting a common policy. This policy will be chosen so that their joint ex-post welfare is maximized:
where and 1 are the weights given to the welfare of Country 1 and 2, respectively.
It is easy to check that, given the …rm's behavior in Lemma 1, the optimal threshold is:
Discussion
It stands from the previous analysis that if the competition authorities have veto power over the decision, then sharing information is never bene…cial as Country 1 is strictly worse o¤ due to the imprecise submitted information (while Country 2 is indi¤erent).
If the authorities also cooperate in the decision taking stage, then whether sharing information is desirable ultimately depends on the average merger that the authorities are facing and on the particular rule used to reach a decision. To illustrate this point, imagine that the merger's welfare consequences in Country 1 are 3 + while in Country 2 are . Imagine that the …rm can choose a variance on the range [2; 10] and that 2 = 4.
If the ex-ante average merger is = 0:5, then the authorities would set the national thresholds b s 1 = 2 and b s 2 = 1:25, so in the absence of information-sharing, the …rm chooses variance 2 for Country 1 and variance 10 for Country 2. Imagine now that the authorities share information and the persuasion process is such that the probability of clearance in case of disagreement is constant and equal to 0:5. ference. Since, authorities also apply their policies to national mergers, this extreme decisions would not be optimal. It is left for future work to explore how the international dimension impacts on the policies to which the countries commit to.
5 Private information about the welfare e¤ects
37
In this Section, we explore the robustness of our results in the assumption that the …rm is not more informed than the competition authority about the merger's welfare e¤ects.
If we assume that is the private information of the …rm then, qualitatively, the …rm's behavior does not change. The optimal variance chosen by the …rm will depend on the merger's type in the same way that it was depending before on the average merger . In particular, in the case of the national merger, a …rm with a bad merger will choose the risky strategy of high variance, while a …rm with a good merger will choose low variance to increase the likelihood of obtaining a high 37 The proofs for this section can be found in Troya-Martinez (2008).
realization of the signal. In the same way, in the case of the multinational merger, the information-sharing agreement will have no impact on the types of merger that are either good or bad for both countries at the same time. However, for those …rms whose merger is good for one country but bad for the other, the choice of the variance may be non-monotonic in their type in the same way as was found in Proposition 3.
However, with this new assumption, there is a signi…cant change in the authority's behavior because the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) does not generally hold, due to the way in which the …rm optimally responds to the threshold rule.
In particular, a very large s is more likely to come from a (bad) merger below the threshold because the distribution of the signal sent by such a merger has fatter tails.
If the MLRP does not hold, then the cut-o¤ rule may not be optimal. However, if
we nonetheless restrict the authority to using the cut-o¤ rule, then we can show that the equilibrium threshold, when the average merger is welfare detrimental, is stricter than the full information threshold and, contrary to what we found in Section 3, it does not change with the authority's ability to commit.
The intuition for this result is as follows. There are two types of e¤ects following an increase in the commitment threshold, b s : the direct and the strategic e¤ect.
The direct e¤ect is the result from the trade-o¤ between the bene…t of decreasing the clearance probability of a bad merger against the cost of decreasing the clearance probability of a good merger. The direct bene…t can be interpreted as a type II error of clearing a merger that should be blocked. By increasing b s we make this error less likely. Similarly, the direct cost can be interpreted as a type I error of blocking a merger when in fact it should be allowed and by increasing b s we make this error more likely.
The strategic (or indirect) e¤ect is the result of the change in the …rm's strategy resulting from moving merger types from above to below the threshold (i.e. when the …rm switches from V L to V H , a good type has less chances of being cleared). Given that the authority values precision, as this allows her to take more informed decisions, the fact that in this new framework she chooses the same threshold regardless of whether or not she can commit to a policy may be puzzling. It seems natural to think that the mechanism highlighted in the Corollary 1 would still apply (that is, if under no commitment, the authority sets a threshold b s , she would gain from committing to a lower threshold b s as this would induce the types in the interval [b s ; b s ] to reduce their equilibrium variance from V H to V L ). However, when the authority is considering a marginal decrease in the threshold, she only takes into account the strategic e¤ects of the marginal type b s which consists in decreasing the variance from V H to V L . However, for b s (the type at the margin) the probability that the realization of the signal is above b s is 1 2 in both cases. Therefore, since the marginal change in the …rm's behavior generated by the ability to commit cancels out, the criterion used to set such a threshold is the same under both regimes. In particular, by lowering the threshold, the authority only trades o¤ the increase in the type II error and the decrease in the type I error (i.e. the direct e¤ect).
Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to study the impact of an information-sharing agreement on the incentives of the …rm to provide precise information to the authorities.
We …nd that the agreement has no impact on the …rm with an average merger that is welfare enhancing for both countries at the same time. This would explain why in some cases, where the …rm is sure that a merger does not raise competition issues, he voluntarily grants a con…dentiality waiver to the authorities. However, the agreement a¤ects the behavior of the …rm whose average merger is welfare enhanc- In our analysis, we ignore a very important cost attached to the exchange of con…dential information: the danger of leakage of commercially sensitive information to third parties. This can be clearly an issue when cooperation involves competition agencies in countries where the law for protecting con…dential information is weak or where the credibility of the agency is low. We also ignore many bene…ts. For instance, the exchange of information facilitates the discussion about the case and minimizes the possibility of missing an issue that needs an enforcement action. In the merger cases, it also eliminates con ‡icting decisions and remedies.
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A possible way to enrich the setup is to let each authority receive a di¤erent realization from the same random signal 39 . In this context, sharing information increases the quantity of information on which to base their decisions and allows them to better infer the level of precision used by the …rm. Thus, noise becomes more costly and …rms with bad average mergers will have their behavior a¤ected.
There is room for the more lenient authority to bene…t from the agreement.
We compared the no-information-sharing regime with the information-sharing regime, keeping the policies of the competition authorities …xed, as we were interested in exploring the changes in the …rm's behavior following the agreement. The other motivation for proceeding this way was that these agreements do not usually contemplate changes in policies. Therefore, one possible direction of future work would be to enrich the model by allowing the competition agencies to strategically adapt their policies to the new regime. This would allow us to assess the total impact of the information-sharing regime, which not only includes the change in the …rm's behavior but also the change in the authority's policy.
Finally, the lessons from this model can be applied to a variety of situations in industrial organization and political economy that involve binary decisions. For instance, the model can apply to the information submitted to a sectorial regulator or central bank and a competition authority (as is the case with the mergers involving 38 A successful example of a merger involving cooperation between agencies that illustrates these points was the Holnam/Lafarge case. A waiver granted by the parties allowed the U.S. and Canadian agencies to e¤ectively improve the coordination, which ended up in a more informed decisionmaking (see Valentine (2000) ). 39 This could be the case if information-sharing happens at a late state of the investigation process, where the di¤erent signal's realisations can be interpreted as the information obtained from the particular questions (interviews, questionnaires, etc.) carried out by each authority. banks), to interviews in a recruitment process with two interviewers, to a project approval by di¤erent departments within a …rm, to reforms submitted to bicameral parliaments or, more generally, to a politician trying to gain support for a policy in front of two audiences with di¤erent opinions about the policy.
Appendix
Example 1 Assume that R commits to clear the merger with probability Z(s), where Z(s) is the cumulative distribution of z(s) N (m; v) and m and v are optimally chosen by R. M chooses V to maximize the probability of clearance:
The …rst order condition is: Proof of Lemma 1. The …rst derivative of P (V ) with respect to V is:
Using the fact that
@s 2 , we can integrate (4) to obtain:
The optimal V is determined by the slope of g(s; V ) at the conjectured policy parameter, which give us Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The logic of the proof is as follows. We …rst solve the authority's problem ignoring the constraint about the …rm's behavior. Then, we …nd under which conditions the constraint will be binding.
Ignoring the constraint; the …rst order condition for a given variance V ( ; b s) is:
And the second order condition is:
The second order condition is locally satis…ed because the …rst term is zero when the …rst order condition is satis…ed and the second term is always negative.
by Lemma 1, the …rm chooses V L . The signal has the maximum level of informativeness, therefore the constraint in (2) does not bind and the solution is equal to b s . Conversely, when < b s, the …rm chooses V H and R may prefer the constrained solution b s = (by Lemma 1, this is the minimum threshold that induces the …rm to choose V L instead of V H ) due to the resulting increase in the informativeness of the signal. In particular, the constrained solution will be chosen if the authority's objective function evaluated at this point is larger than evaluated at b s :
Let us show that (6) is satis…ed for > e and not satis…ed for < e , where e is to be de…ned. Integrating by parts, rewrite (6) as:
; V H # We want to determine whether there exists some value of in the interval ( 1; 0]
for which (6) is satis…ed. Note that (6) is trivially satis…ed when = 0 as the left-hand side is zero and g(0; V L ) g (0; V H ) > 0. Conversely, when ! 1, the left-hand side tends to +1 while the right-hand side tends to
. Therefore the inequality is violated. This means that there exists at least one value of , e , such that the expected welfare are equal:
Note that e 6 = 0. In order to show that this value is unique, we need to show that the slope of the di¤erence of expected welfare is strictly decreasing at = e :
This expression is negative for e < 0, therefore there is a unique e for which condition (7) holds.
The comparative statics with respect to V L :
and with respect to V H :
noting that e < 0 and that therefore G so the sign will depend on .
From @P (V ) @V = 0, we …nd the "critical variance":
The second derivative is: 
where the last line follows from plugging in V ( ; ) from (8) . The sign of (9) is larger and, thus, (9) is negative.
Proof of Corollary 2. First note that for = 
Using the symmetry of g(s; V ) around , (10) becomes:
Note that 2 b s 2 b s 1 for all 2 (b s 1 ; s M ).
De…ne e s as the smallest value of s at which g(s; V H ) and g(s; V L ) intersect:
Rewrite e s as e s = c(V L ; V H ). It can be shown that c(V L ; V H ) increases with V H and decreases when V L decrease.
We are only able to determine M's choices when e s < 2 b s 2 and when b s 1 < e s;
therefore, the conditions that follow are su¢ cient but not necessary. 
